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This work analyzes the concept of randomness in binary sequences from three 
different perspectives: mathematically, statistically, and psychologically and examines 
the research on human perception of randomness and the question of whether or not 
humans can simulate random behavior.  Generally, research shows that human subjects 
have great difficulty producing random sequences, even when they are instructed and 
motivated.  We survey some of the literature and present some leading theoretical 
proposals.  Finally, we present some basic statistical tests that can be used to evaluate 




Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
What is randomness?  Most people have some intuitions about what it is.  Many 
would cite examples of randomness, like the tossing of a coin or the occurrence of 
mutations in a gene.  People behave and events in nature occur randomly on a regular basis.  
However, research has shown that when humans are instructed to act randomly, generally 
they are unsuccessful at this task. Usually, they are not capable of distinguishing accurately 
between random and non-random data—indeed, their perceptions appear to be biased in 
certain specific ways.  Perhaps, this inability to randomize lies in misconceptions about 
randomness, or it could be that scientists have yet to provide an experiment engaging 
enough for humans to demonstrate some untapped randomization skills.   
 
Much research has been done since 1953 on the perception that humans have of 
randomness and ability of human subjects to generate random sequences.  In 1972, W. A. 
Wagenaar surveyed the literature available on studies involving generation of random 
sequences by human subjects.  Of the thirteen studies that he examined, only one of the 
experiments reported that the human subjects were good randomizers.   
 
A variety of measures have been taken and adjusted to broaden the experimental 
conditions in hopes of determining the precise extent to which humans are able to perform 
randomization tasks and the respects in which they regularly fail.  Studies of 
randomization by humans can be divided into two categories: production and judgment.  In 
experiments, participants were either instructed to produce a sequence that was later tested 
for randomness, or they were asked to judge sequences already available as random or 
non-random.  As an example of a production study, Bakan (1960) had human subjects 
produce three hundred responses of “heads” and “tails.”  They were told to try to produce a 
sequence that would resemble what would be produced by actually flipping a fair coin.  As 
an example of a judgment study, Cook (1967) asked subjects to examine sequences of 
binary digits one hundred symbols long.  They had to compare two at a time and then 
make judgments as to which was more patterned. 
 
In such experiments, the kind of data subjects were asked to produce or examine 
varied.  Often, the data was a sequence of symbols from some fixed alphabet.  The size of 
the alphabet has ranged from two to twenty-six, and in different experiments it has 
consisted of letters, digits, head-tails, button pushing, or marked tokens (e.g., cards marked 
with “X” or “O”).  This means that the subjects, when constructing or judging a sequence, 
could have as little as two choices or as many as twenty-six.  The two-choice alternative 
classically involved trying to mimic the tossing of a coin.  In the case of twenty-six 
alternatives, subjects might have been instructed to pretend they were pulling letters of the 
alphabet from a box and recording the result.  Despite the wide variety possible in choice 
of alphabet, most studies used a binary alphabet, and this paper will concentrate on this 
case.   
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Instructions to subjects have included asking them to produce symbols from the 
designated alphabet “as randomly as possible” or in imitation of some known random 
process.  In judgment experiments, two or more sequences might be given simultaneously 
and subjects asked to determine which is most random, or subjects might observe a 
sequence as it is produced and be asked to decide periodically if it conforms to a random 
process.  Some studies have used computer input or output devices as a means for subjects 
to generate or view data.  Subjects have been required to press numeric or alphabetic keys, 
or they have reviewed sequences presented on a computer screen.   
 
Some production experiments have been subject-paced, while others demand 
responses at intervals from 0.25 seconds to 4 seconds.  Weiss (1964), used a one second 
and two second pilot light to signal his subjects to respond by pressing one of two buttons.  
Baddeley (1966) conducted an experiment with paced and un-paced conditions, finding 
that randomness decreased as pace increased.   
 
An overwhelming number of experiments indicate that humans fail to produce 
random responses even when instructed and motivated to do so.  Many studies report a 
tendency for subjects to produce sequences with negative recency, i.e., too many 
alternations.  Judgment studies are consistent in indicating that human subjects perceive 
sequences with too many alternations (THTHTH...) as random.  Thus, some researchers 
have concluded that negative recency is the culprit explaining sub-optimal randomization 
in humans.  However, a small number of studies have noticed “positive bias” (or positive 
recency) in data.  This is a sequence with too many repetitions (TTTTT... or HHHHH...).  
Budescu (1987) proposed that human randomizing behavior could be modeled as a 
Markov process.  This accommodates both negative and positive recency.  Budescu 
claimed support for this model in experiments with 18 subjects. 
 
Although the research mentioned so far strongly suggests that human subjects are 
sub-optimal randomizers, a few papers have supported human subjects in their ability to 
behave randomly or have attempted to explain human behavior in randomization tasks 
without denying the possibility that under the right circumstances humans might be more 
successful.  One such case is Ross (1955).  His subjects stamped cards with one of two 
symbols and were instructed to arrange them in a random order.  His results did not 
support the idea that human subjects over-alternate. In another example, Cook (1967) 
concluded that the subjects were successful in recognizing the bias in certain sequences.   
 
Diener and Thompson (1985) addressed the problem of how an observer decides 
whether a series was generated by a random process.  In this study, subjects viewed 
sequences of “heads” and “tails” and were asked to judge which ones had been created by 
a random process similar to the tossing of a coin.  Diener and Thompson concluded that 
rather than directly recognizing a sequence as representative of a random process, subjects 
decided that a sequence was random only after eliminating alternative nonrandom 
sequences.   
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 Neuringer (1986) showed that subjects, who do not possess randomization skills at 
first, may learn to produce random-like behavior if provided with proper information 
training.   
 
Following this introduction, we begin by providing a concise discussion of random 
experiments and related concepts including discrete random variables and their 
distributions.  The subsequent chapter looks at a random sequence from three different 
perspectives: mathematical, statistical, and psychological.  Next, we survey some of the 
literature involving human beings’ concepts of randomness and whether or not they can 
mimic randomness successfully.  The survey specifically deals with the works of Budescu, 
Neuringer, and Falk and Konold.  Finally, we describe some statistical tests for 
randomness, and illustrate them through computer simulations using Mathematica.   
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Chapter 2. Probability Theory 
This chapter is devoted to providing the reader with an overview of Probability 
Theory.  Our primary interest involves determining how well humans can simulate random 
experiments.  The foundation of the research conducted on randomness studies involving 
human subjects, is the concept of a random experiment.  Thus, it is crucial to describe this 
concept and its characteristics, which is the primary focus of this chapter. Another aspect 
of this section is to recognize that standard randomness tests depend on using probability 
distributions, associated with certain judiciously selected random variables.  We will 
specifically deal with the discrete random variable and its associated probability 
distribution. 
We begin with the idea of a random experiment.  Because a random experiment is a 
direct abstraction from situations with which most people have plenty of experience, 
expositions of probability theory often begin here.  This is the connection between the 
formal calculus of probability theory and real-world applications.  Basically, a random 
experiment is one in which the outcome cannot be predicted with certainty.  An important 
assumption concerning a random experiment is that it can be repeated indefinitely under 
conditions that are essentially the same.  The significance of this assumption stems from 
the idea that probability theory analyzes the long-term behavior as the experiment is 
replicated.   
Examples of random experiments—or concrete realizations of the general 
concept—include: 
• tossing a coin once 
• tossing a coin 100 times,  
• throwing two dice,  
• selecting a card from a shuffled deck,  
• selecting a random sample of people from a larger population,  
• selecting 25 people and counting how many are left-handed. 
Each of these examples has three important aspects: a sample space, an event space, and a 
probability measure, which we now define.  Numerous examples of each concept will be 
given in the next section.   
A sample space, commonly denoted by S, consists of the set of all possible outcomes.  For 
example, when tossing a coin, the possible outcomes are head (H) or tail (T).  (If anything 
else occurs, we have not successfully performed the experiment.)   
An event space (Ε*), contains all subsets of the sample space.  In other words, an event E 
occurs if the observed outcome s is an element of E (s ∈  E).  If a coin is tossed 100 times, 
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some examples of events are the following: 1) more heads than tails occur, 2) exactly 50 
heads occur, 3) a head is obtained on the 5th toss. 
The probability of an event is a measure of how likely it is for the event to occur.  
Suppose we conduct an experiment where we throw two dice, and we are interested in the 
probability that both dice show an even number.  When the two dice are thrown, there are 
36 total possibilities, all with equal probability.  If we consider the event that both dice 
show an even number, we have {(2,2),(2,4),(2,6), (4,2),(4,4),(4,6), (6,2), (6,4), and (6,6)}as 





=  . 
A probability measure (or distribution), P, is a real-valued function defined on the 
collection of events.  It must satisfy certain criteria, but we will postpone describing them 
until Section 2.2. 
2.1 The Sample Space and The Event Space 
Recall that the sample space of a random experiment is a set S that includes all 
possible outcomes of the experiment.  (A set is just a collection of objects, where the 
objects are referred to elements of the set.)   
The sample space consists of exactly the set of possible outcomes.  It serves as the 
universal set for all questions concerned with the experiment.  
Example 2.1.1.  Suppose one throws a standard die and records the outcome. Then, the 
sample space is S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, the set of possible outcomes.  
Example 2.1.2.  Suppose someone tosses a coin in the air and observes the result.  Thus, 
the sample space },{ HeadTailS = .   
In creating a sample space, we need to decide on an appropriate level of detail.  
Whatever those things are that we choose to call the outcomes, they become the irreducible 
atoms of any further description of what can happen.  If we think about shooting an arrow 
in the air, we might care about whose land it falls on, and we might never have any need to 
know more than that.  In this case, the set of nearby estates could become the sample space.  
But we might have much more detailed concerns—to the extent, possibly, of needing to 
know, to the nearest inch, the distance of the landing point from three fixed markers.   
 Sample spaces can be finite or infinite. An experiment involving the tossing of a 
finite number of coins or the throwing of some fixed number of dice has a finite sample 
space.  An infinite sample space occurs in an experiment where a real-number measure is 
taken: e.g., measuring heights of people.  Infinite sample spaces also occur where the 
outcomes are associated with an integer or a whole number, e.g., tossing a coin until a head 
occurs and counting the number of tosses required.  
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 Any subset of the sample space of an experiment is referred to as an “event”.  This 
use of the word “event” is quite distant from the common meaning.  The idea is that when 
we perform an experiment, we may not be interested in the particular outcome, but a 
particular property that an outcome may have.  Now, each property of outcomes 
corresponds exactly to a subset of sample space—namely the set of all outcomes with the 
said property.  Every time that the experiment is run, a given event E occurs provided the 
outcome of the experiment is an element of E.  If the outcome of the experiment is not an 
element of E, then it does not occur.  Note that the sample space S is an event because by 
definition it always occurs.  At the other end, the empty set (∅ ) or the set with no 
elements, is also an event.  By the same reasoning that the sample space S is an event that 
always occurs, the empty set is an event that never occurs.  The event space (Ε*) is the set 
of all events that can result once an experiment is run.  In the case of a finite sample space, 
event space is the set of all subsets of sample space.  
Example 2.1.3.  For instance, consider an experiment where a coin is tossed three 
successive times.  Let },,,,,,,{ THHHTTTTHHHTTHTHTHTTTHHHS = be the 
associated sample space.  Perhaps, the interest lies in the event “the number of heads 
exceeds the number of tails.”  For any outcome of this experiment, we can easily determine 
whether this event does or does not occur by counting the number of heads.  It is obvious 
that HHH, HTH, HHT, THH are the only elements of S corresponding to outcomes for 
which this event occurs.   
 The event, “the number of heads exceeds the number of tails,” occurs when the 
outcome is in the set E = {HHH, HTH, HHT, THH} ⊆ S.  However, if the observations 
result in one of the other elements of S, then the event in question does not occur.  Below 
are some other event possibilities given three successive coin tosses. 
Description of Event and its Corresponding Subset of S 
Second toss is heads – {HHH, HHT,THH,THT} 
All tosses show the same face – {HHH, TTT} 
Second toss is heads and the number of heads is exactly 2 – {HHT,THH} 
Second toss is heads or the number of heads is exactly 2 - {HHH, HTH, THT, HHT, THH} 
Example 2.1.4.  Suppose we are presented with a deck of cards, instructed to shuffle them, 
select a card at random, and observe the selected card.  Here, the associated sample space S 
is the set of all 52 cards—ace through king in all four suits.  Suppose we are interested in 
the event “the card selected is either a diamond or a heart.”  The elements of S in this event 
are the 26 diamonds and hearts.  The probability of this event is 
2
1 . 
2.2 Probability Measure 
Definition 2.2.1.  A probability measure P for a random experiment is a real-valued 
function defined on the collection of events satisfying the following three axioms:  
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i. P(E) ≥ 0 for all E (where E represents an event) 
ii. P(S) = 1 (where S represents the sample space) 
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The first two axioms are straightforward.  The first axiom just states the probability of 
each event is zero or greater.  Axiom II states that the probability of the sample space S is 1.  
The third axiom, known as countable additivity, concerns a countable, disjoint collection 
of events.  It states that the probability of a union of a finite or countably infinite collection 
of disjoint events is the sum of the corresponding probabilities. 
Example 2.2.1.  Suppose we toss a coin three successive times and record the results. 
Observe the possible outcomes: 
S = {HHH, TTT, HTH, THT, HHT, TTH, THH, HTT} 
We now describe a probability measure on this set.  
Let ) of elements ofnumber  the(
8
1:)( EEP •= .  We shall show that this P satisfies the 
axioms.  It is clear that P(E) ≥ 0 for all E.  Also, P(S) = 18
8
1
=• .  Finally, suppose that 
E1 ...,Ej are disjoint sets.  Then the number of elements in the union of these events is equal 
to the sum of the number of elements in each individual set.  This shows that Axiom 3 
holds.  
When would this be a reasonable probability measure?  If the coin is fair, then we 
would expect each of the 8 one-element events to have equal probability.  The second and 
third axioms then force the probability of each one-element event to be
8
1 .  Finally, the 
third axiom forces us to use the definition above. 
Of course, this is not the only probability measure we might want to consider.  
Suppose we had a biased coin that landed on heads only 
3
1 of the time.  Then it would be 
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⎛ , where n is 
the number of occurrences of tails in the outcome in the event.  The probability of an event 
with more than one element is found by adding together the probabilities of the one-
element subsets of that event. 
 8
Example 2.2.2.  To exhibit an experiment having an infinite sample space, suppose a coin 
is tossed until a head is observed.  We designate the outcome of the experiment as the first 
time that a head turns up. Then, the sample space for this experiment is S = {∅ , 1, 2, 
3,...,N,...}.  Review the possibilities that follow. 
# of tosses before head is observed Probability that the first head is observed on the 
given number of tosses 
)(1 H  
2
1  
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Now we have defined the sample space—{1, 2, 3,..}, and we have partially defined 
the probability measure, in that we have specified a probability for each one-element event.  
From the above table, it is obvious that the first axiom is satisfied.  To show Axiom 2 
holds, we know a sum exists because the partial sums form an increasing sequence which 
is bounded above, so the partial sums have a limit. This sum is a convergent series, which 
we know converges to 1.  Finally, the last axiom is also clearly satisfied.  
Thus, we have the necessary ingredients for a random experiment: the sample space, 
the event space and a probability measure.  Together, these three items define a probability 
space (S, E*,P). 
Example 2.2.3.  (Birthday Problem.)  This is a classic problem in probability classes.  The 
gist of the birthday problem is as follows: Given a group of people, what is the probability 
of at least two people in the group having the same birthday?  The phrase “having the 
same birthday” means that they celebrate their birthday on the same day. Thus, the year of 
the birth is omitted.  We will ignore leap years and assume that birthdays are uniformly 
distributed throughout the year. 
 Suppose n people are chosen at random, and their birthdays are noted.  Then, the 
sample space consists of 365n possible outcomes.  Because the birthdays are uniformly 
distributed and the people are chosen randomly, each of the outcomes is equally likely.    
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Thus, as before, each one-element event has the same probability—this being n365
1 .  Our 
sample space being finite, the probability of an arbitrary event E is the sum of the 
probabilities of the one-element events in it.  Thus P(E) = n
k
365
, where k is the number of 
outcomes in E.    
 To see the reasoning of this example most clearly, we examine the probabilities one 
step at a time.  There are 365 distinct birthdays for one person.  If two people are chosen, 
there are 364 different ways that the second could have a birthday without matching the 
first.  If three people are chosen, there are 363 different birthdays that do not match the 
other two.  So, if three people are chosen at random, the probability of their birthdays all 
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= .  Since the above formula 





1 −−  
calculates the probability of at least two people having the same birthday.  Now, as 
mentioned earlier, the results of this problem are surprising.   
Examine the table below.   
Table 2.2.1  








What is interesting is the fact that if 40 people are chosen at random, the 
probability that at least two of those people from that sample will share the same birthday 
is as high as 89.12%!  Most people would not think that the probability for this sample size 
would be that high.  A graphic illustration depicting the probability of at least one match 
versus the sample size is shown in Figure 2.2.1 
   Probability of at Least One Match Versus the Sample Size 








From the graph, if one selects 60 persons randomly, he/she can almost guarantee that at 
least two people will have the same birthday. 
2.3 The Discrete Random Variable and Its Distribution Function 
This section introduces the discrete random variable and its distribution function.  It also 
presents some examples to illustrate these concepts. 
Definition 2.3.1.  Given a random experiment with a countable sample space S, a random 
variable, denoted by X, is a function from S into another set W [9, pg. 212].   
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The definition above allows a generalization to continuous sample spaces, but we will 
never need this level of generality in this thesis.  Indeed, the only random experiments that 
are relevant to the problems we will address have finite sample spaces.   
 A random variable represents a measurement of interest in the context of the 
random experiment.  A random variable X is random in the sense that its value is 
dependent upon the outcome of the experiment.  Moreover, it cannot be predicted with 
certainty before the experiment is run.  Each time the experiment is run, an outcome s ∈  S 
occurs, and a given random variable X takes on the value X(s) ∈  W.   
Example 2.3.1.  If an experiment is run where a coin is tossed until the first tail occurs, 
then the number of heads that results before the tail appears is a random variable.  Call this 
variable X.  If the sample space is S = {T, HT, HHT, HHHT, ...}.  Then, X(T) = 0, X(HT) 
=1, X(HHT) = 2, etc. 
Example  2.3.2.  Suppose the experiment is flipping a coin 100 times.  The following are 
random variables:   
• The number of heads (in an outcome) 
• The number of alternations, i.e., transitions from head to tail or tail to head 
• The number of complete runs, where a complete run is a maximal 
uninterrupted sequence of the same face. 
• The maximum length of a complete run. 
• The average length of all the complete runs. 
Definition 2.3.2.  Let x be a number and let X: S→W be a random variable on a sample 
space S.  Then the event {s ∈  S | X(s) = x} is denoted {X = x}.  The function f defined by 
f(x): = P({X = x}) is called  the probability distribution associated with the variable X  [9, 
pg. 213].  
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Chapter 3. Randomness 
Randomness can be associated with the lawless, the pattern-less, the unpredictable, 
and the haphazard.  These words are ambiguous and appeal more to feelings than to precise 
definitions.  Randomness is a subtle concept that tends to elude attempts at scientific or 
mathematical precision.   
 
This chapter will present and discuss three general ways that scientists have 
devised to sharpen the idea of randomness.  Mathematical approaches attempt to define the 
property of randomness in infinite strings.  As is common in mathematics, this removes the 
problem from the world of direct experience.  Randomness becomes a property that an 
object in an abstract domain may have or may fail to have.  We may reason about the 
objects, random and otherwise, that belong to that domain.  However, none of our senses 
can interact with them in any direct manner at all. 
 
The statistical approach, in contrast, skirts the issue of the essential nature of 
randomness.  Its tactic is merely to ask, “What would suffice as good evidence of 
randomness?”  This method focuses on the fact that though we may lack the ability to 
precisely define randomness, we nonetheless know enough about it to be able to recognize 
clues of its presence, when they are around.   
 
The third approach is psychological.  In this, we are even further from the question 
of the essential nature of randomness.  Here, the question ceases to be “What is 
randomness?” and becomes, “What do people characterize as random?  What do they 
accept as evidence of randomness?”  There are two surprises here.  The first is that people 
tend to have consistent ideas concerning randomness, classifying what they believe to be 
more random or less random roughly in the same way.  The second is that their perceptions 
about randomness differ in subtle but uniform ways from the more rigorous ideas 
developed in the mathematical and statistical approaches. 
 
3.1 The Mathematical Approach 
 
One might suppose a random sequence could easily be defined as a pattern-less 
sequence, where all of the numbers in that sequence occur with equal frequency, and all 
subsequences pass statistical tests for randomness.  There seem to be more difficulties 
involved though.   
 
To further explain, suppose a binary sequence is constructed implementing the 
coin-tossing example, consisting of each possible outcome of successive tosses.  The 
occurrence of “Heads” is represented by “1”; “tails” is represented by “0.”  A reasonable 
question to ask would be, “When is a binary sequence random?”  Is it possible to make a 
reasonable mathematical definition that really clarifies the meaning of “random”? 
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Suppose you perform three trials of tossing a coin twenty times.  Examine the 





The first result, twenty heads in twenty tosses, looks suspicious.  The second and 
third appear rather random.  However, the second sequence consists of the first twenty 
digits of the binary expansion 12 − , and therefore was obtained by a process—root 
extraction.  Thus, it fails to be random since it is clearly generated by a rule [16, pg. 48]. 









⎛ .  
So, why does it seem that the 2nd and 3rd sequences are random while the first sequence is 
not?  (Note that the third string actually was obtained by tossing a coin.)   
 
For these sequences, it is only possible to develop a perception of degrees of 
randomness, there being no abrupt distinction of the set of all sequences into random and 
nonrandom ones.  Indeed, the idea that some finite sequences might be random, while 
others are not, leads to a problem. Given a finite binary sequence that is considered random, 
there is no cause to claim that the same binary sequence with one entry altered is not 
random.  If in a finite sequence we can change one entry at a time without destroying 
randomness (if it is present), then we must also be able to change any two or any three or 
any number of entries whatsoever, still without making it non-random.  But any sequence 
may be turned into any other by a finite number of changes.  So every finite sequence is 
random, or none is. 
 
Although real-world applications restrict one to finite encounters, the mathematical 
approach concerns infinite strings.  The previous discussion suggests why this seems 
necessary.  Every finite string is unique and special in some ways, and yet 
indistinguishable from other strings in probability.   
 
Volchan (2002) reviews the most important mathematical approaches to 
randomness.  He classified attempts to define randomness in three groups as follows:  
 
• approaches based on stochastic-ness (or frequency stability) 
• approaches based on incompressibility (or chaotic-ness) and  
• approaches based on typicality.   
 
All three proposals involved bringing to bear ideas related to algorithms and 
computability.  The details become quite intricate.  We will give an overview with only as 
much detail as we need for our purpose, which is to examine their bearing on 
psychological studies.  We follow Volchan’s exposition closely. 
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The notion of randomness as stochastic-ness originated with Richard von Mises.  It 
was developed by Alonzo Church and Abraham Wald.  Von Mises proposed that 
randomness could be modeled in a mathematically precise way by means of certain 
sequences of 0s and 1s, which he named “collectives.”  He coined the terms stochasticness 
or frequency stability, which arose from the statistical regularity that he observed in 
random experiments such as coin-tossing, to name the defining property of a collective.  
Without attempting  to provide full details, the condition for a sequence of 0s and 1s to be 
a collective is that the ratio of 0s to 1’s should approach the same limiting value in the 
sequence itself and in every subsequence of a certain, specific type.   
Von Mises received many criticisms, and his arguments were considered inexact.  
Eventually, Kamke showed collectives do not exist unless appropriate restrictions (which 
von Mises failed to state) are placed on the subsequences.  However, in 1937 Wald showed  
that collectives do exist if restrictions are placed on sets of admissible selections.  By 
placing restrictions on the subsequences, this result opened the question of which 
subsequences should be required to meet the asymptotic condition on the ratio of 0s to 1s.  
In 1940, Alonzo Church proposed that in order to separate those sequences that are 
intuitively random, the set of admissible selections should consist of computable functions.   
Church, and another mathematician Alan Turing, are known for the so-called 
Church-Turing thesis.  The Church-Turing thesis is an idea in computer science stating 
that every effective computation or algorithm can be carried out by a Turing machine. Any 
computer program in any of the conventional programming languages can be translated 
into a Turing machine, and any Turing machine can be translated into most programming 
languages.  Introduced in 1936 by Alan Turing, the Turing machine is an abstract model of 
computer execution and storage that gives a mathematically precise definition of an 
algorithm or other mechanical procedure.  The concept of the Turing machine is based on 
the idea of a person executing a well-defined procedure by reading and writing symbols on 
a potentially infinite strip of paper. The person needs to remember one of a finite set of 
states, and the procedure is formulated in very basic steps.   
Although the von Mises-Church-Wald proposal had some desirable traits, it 
revealed a severe flaw in 1939 when Jean Ville showed that collectives are not random 
enough by proving that there are collectives with a preference for 1s over 0s. In this sense, 
the cumulative number of 1s always exceeds the number of 0s.  As a result, this first 
proposal to define a random sequence was unsatisfactory.   
The second proposal originated with Ray Solomonoff, Andrei Kolmogrov, and 
Gregory Chaitin described randomness as incompressibility.  The logic behind this idea is 
that a sequence is irregular or patternless if it cannot be described more efficiently than by 
giving the entire sequence itself.  This is known as algorithmic complexity and declares a 
sequence random if no program other than the entire sequence itself can generate or 
describe it.  Kolmogorov, Solomonoff, and Chaitin incorporated Turing machines in their 
definitions and theorems in support of their quest to define a random sequence.  One of 
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Kolmogorov’s propositions called an infinite sequence random if it had initial segments of 
high complexity, designating these sequences as incompressible.  Unfortunately, Per 
Martin-Löf showed that no such sequence exists and proposed the third notion of 
randomness, typicality.  In fairness to the second proposal, Chaitin along with several 
others were later able to prove that the incompressibility idea can be made consistent by 
placing suitable restrictions on the class of algorithms.   
When we hear the word “typical,” we can intuitively think of something as 
common or ordinary.  If we consider typical binary sequences, then we could say that these 
sequences are featureless.  Through his research, Martin-Löf incorporates measure theory 
to develop his notion of a random sequence.  Even though his theories contain some 
abstract ideas, they can be simplified in terms of the concept of an effective statistical 
sequential test for randomness.  To further explain, it compares the sequence in question to 
an enumerable sequence. This enumerable test sequence looks for certain regularity 
properties that are considered incompatible with the sequence being random.  Thus, a 
sequence is called Martin-Löf - random if it passes all of the effective sequential tests for 
randomness.  In other words, Martin-Löf concluded that there is a universal sequential test 
that, if passed, defines a sequence as random [14, pg. 60]. 
To date, no serious flaw has been found with Martin-Löf’s definition of a random 
sequence.  Furthermore, Martin-Löf’s notion of random sequences is mathematically 
consistent, making his argument the best candidate for the mathematical definition of a 
random sequence thus far.   
3.2 The Statistical Approach  
   Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar  suggest that we think of  “randomness” as an 
unobservable property of a generating process [3, pg. 429].  A classic example would be 
the previously mentioned “coin toss”. This paragon fully demonstrates random behavior 
because we cannot predict the outcome of the individual coin tosses. If the coin is fair, the 
likelihood of obtaining a “head” is equal to that of obtaining a “tail,” and the occurrence of 
one outcome in a coin toss does not influence future outcomes.  Thus, the proportion of 
heads (or tails) will converge to 
2
1  after a significantly large number of tosses. 
 
This shows that though we may lack a precise definition of randomness that would 
be useful and interesting in an abstract domain, we nonetheless agree fairly well that a 
sample of output from a random generating process should have certain statistical 
properties.  There should, for example, be about 
2
1  heads in a large sample.  Similarly, 
there ought to be no predominance of either option among the flips that follow heads. 
 
Suppose you ask a human subject to attempt to simulate a random experiment, say 
by providing a string of 100 0s and 1s each time you request it —for reasonable 
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compensation, of course. You might form the hypothesis that some abstract model of the 
production process provides an accurate account of what the subject is doing.  For example, 
the abstract model might be a random experiment—e.g., the flipping of a fair coin.   
  
 Now, given any random variable on the sample space, you can evaluate that 
variable at the string provided by the subject.  If the model is not too complex, you can 
find the probability distribution for the variable that the model determines.  From this, you 
can find the expected value of the random variable in the model. Also, you can determine 
the probability that the value of the variable at a random outcome departs from the 
expected value for the model by any given amount, say D.  In other words, we can compute 
P(| X - Em | > D), where  Em  is the expected value in the model.  By this computation we 
can judge whether the subject’s data was likely to have been produced by a random 
experiment.  Now, if this probability is very small when D  = | X(subject’s sequence) - Em |, 
then we take it as evidence against the model.  This is the idea of hypothesis testing, which 
we will describe in more detail later. 
 
3.3 The Psychological Approach   
 
In general, people feel as though they understand what they mean when speaking of 
randomness.  They communicate in daily affairs using their intuitive understanding of this 
term.  Still, randomness, as we have seen, is a complex and subtle notion, and attempts to 
define randomness include complex philosophical or mathematical concepts.  Is there some 
uniformity or agreement in the way people employ the notion?  If so, does it agree with the 
technical conceptions we’ve described?  This is a question of psychology – an important 
and non-trivial one.   
 
Psychologists have been conducting studies for many years trying to pinpoint 
people’s subjective sense of randomness.  A majority of these studies examine generation 
of randomness by participants, particularly production involving two symbol types.  A 
most prominent feature of their research shows that people identify randomness with an 
excess of alternation between symbol types.  Participants do not perceive sequences that 
are typically random as random because to them, the runs appear to be too long, or they 
produce sequences containing too many short runs.  This bias might be an expression of 
the “gambler’s fallacy.”  This occurs when people assume that randomness self-corrects 
itself.  In other words, if “black” has won six times in a row on the roulette wheel, people 
believe “red” is due.  If the roulette wheel is unbiased, the six consecutive occurrences of 
“black” do not affect the incidental probability of “red.” 
  
Explanations have been offered for this behavior. One contends that the subjects 
produce or perceive sequences reflecting their own intuitive and subjective concept of 
randomness, which is incorrect (the gambler’s fallacy).  That is, it may not necessarily 
coincide with the probabilistic model.  Another argues that humans are simply restricted by 
functional limitations such as the limited ability to ignore their own recent responses, 
limited ability to generate paced responses, or other limitations.   
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Allen Neuringer, a well-known psychologist involved in randomness studies, offers 
lack of skill as an explanation.  He claims that people fail to comprehend all the 
requirements of randomness and have very little experience dealing with random series.  
Thus, they fail to generate such series when told to do so.  Psychologist, David Budescu 
presented a stochastic model to explain human subjects’ deviation from randomness, 
which concentrates on the process generating the sequence, and suggested that future work 
should consider the processes used by subjects in a randomization task rather than the 
series of outcomes that result. Falk and Konold claimed that people associate the 
randomness of a sequence with how difficult it is to mentally encode it. These will all be 
discussed in detail in the next section. 
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Chapter 4.  Can People Behave Randomly? 
This chapter focuses on three leading contemporary theoretical problems of 
randomness studies involving human subjects.  Numerous studies have concluded that 
human subjects are suboptimal random generators.  Those conducting the experiments 
suggested a variety of reasons as to why participants were not successful, such as attention 
span, boredom, or misconceptions of what true randomness really is. This section provides 
some of the leading contemporary theoretical problems and provides potential suggestions 
to improve future results.   
David Budescu’s work entitled “A Markov Model for Generation of Random 
Binary Sequences” will be discussed.  Budescu presented the idea that a subject’s 
performance in a randomization task can be described by a stochastic model, the Markov 
Chain, which is limited to the case of two response alternatives.  This stochastic model 
considered probabilities of certain responses, given its direct predecessor response.  
Budescu claimed that his results fit this model fairly well.   
Allen Neuringer received notable attention for his study, “Can People Behave 
Randomly?: The Role of  Feedback.”  He claimed that humans can learn random-like 
behavior provided they receive proper information and training.  His results support this 
hypothesis, but some criticisms are possible. 
Finally, Ruma Falk and Clifford Konold make an important point in their study, 
“Making Sense of Randomness: Implicit Encoding as a Basis for Judgment.”  They 
incorporate the idea of algorithmic complexity in their hypothesis that human subjects 
judge the randomness of a stimulus in terms of how difficult it is for them to mentally 
encode it.  Their findings support their theory.   
4.1 Budescu 
 
 Budescu proposed that a subject’s performance in a randomization task can be 
described by a stochastic model, the Markov Chain, which is limited to the case of two 
response alternatives.  A Markov Chain is described by the matrix of transition 
probabilities (i.e. probability of a certain response, given the response generated directly 
before), which is illustrated as follows: 
 Trial i 
Trial i-1 1 0 
1 λ 1- λ 
0 ( )
q
p λ−1   ( )
q
pp λ+− 21   
 
The matrix involved three parameters, probabilities P(x = 1) = p, P(x = 0) = q = 
1-p, and the conditional probability, λ, of a “1” following another “1” [4. pg. 27].  Besides 
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focusing on negative recency, there are three assumptions for any Markov chain.  The 
responses in every trial depend on chance, the probability of a given response in every trial 
is independent of all previous responses except for its immediate predecessor, and the 
probability of any response, given the previous response, is independent of the trial’s 
location in the sequence.   
 
Three experiments were conducted to test the validity of this model [4, pg. 28].  
The first experiment involved 18 subjects.  A computer generated a random sequence of 
symbols (first two letters of the Hebrew alphabet).  The word “choose” appeared on the 
screen to prompt the subject to press one of the two buttons on the keyboard.  The 
responses were recorded and cleared from the screen after a certain number of responses 
were obtained.  The subjects were then given a score ranging from zero to thirty (higher 
scores represented better performances).  Their task was to imitate the random selection 
mechanism used by the computer. 
 
The subjects in Experiment 1 generated a total of 36 sequences.  These generated 
sequences were one of three lengths (n = 20, 40, or 60), where n represents the length of 
sequence.  However, the subjects did know the length of the sequence that they would 
generate each time.  Also, the probability values for the two events (two Hebrew letters) 
varied on the following three levels: p = 0.50, 0.70, and 0.90, where p represents the 
probability of the dominant event.  The subjects were advised of the probability values 
each time they generated a sequence.  The values of  n, and the values of p were combined 
in order to consider all sequence possibilities.  After generating nine sequences, the 
subjects repeated this activity three more times. Thus, each subject produced 
( )( ) 144060402034 =++ responses.  During the procedure, the subjects were not given 
any feedback and were not allowed to write down their responses.  The subjects did, 
however, receive monetary payment as an incentive to try to achieve a higher performance 
score.   
  
Budescu claimed that his results supported the stochastic model.  Ten of the 
eighteen participants consistently showed negative bias on all three probability levels, and 
one subject showed positive bias on all three probability levels. Four additional subjects 
displayed negative or positive bias for at least a subset of their generated sequences.  
Budescu also reported from his analyses that the recency bias was strongest when both 
events are equally probable, i.e. p = 0.50.   
 
 The purpose of the second experiment was to test the hypothesis that the 
performance in the first experiment was related to instructions and/or the performance 
score and monetary reward.  Participants were assigned to one of six groups and completed 
one session of eighteen sequences.  However, the groups’ conditions varied by levels of 
instruction (two types: short and detailed) and feedback (three types: same as in 
Experiment 1, score provided but no payoff, and no feedback).  No significant differences 
were found between the two levels of instruction or the three feedback conditions.  The six 
groups achieved similar performance scores leading to a rejection of the former hypothesis.  
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 The third experiment shared features of the first two, except all series were of 
length forty, and the number of previous responses displayed on the screen was 0,1,2,3, or 
all previous responses.  (Recall that the former experiments did not allow the subjects to 
keep track of any responses.)  Eight of the ten subjects produced too many alternations in 
their sequences.  One subject produced too many repetitions (positive recency), and the 
other subject was inconsistent.   
 
 Budescu claimed that the Markov Model fit most of the subjects’ responses fairly 
well.  Fifty-two percent of the participants in all three experiments consistently showed 
negative bias, and eight percent showed positive bias. However, if only the first and third 
experiments are considered the percentages are considerably higher.  In this case, seventy-
one percent of the subjects were classified into negative bias and fourteen percent fell into 
the positive bias category. 
 
 Budescu’s goal was to provide a reasonable descriptive model that showed 
consistency with the available empirical results.  Although he did not test his data 
rigorously, he claimed success due to the following:  
 
• The model used was the first one to clearly identify various independent styles in 
randomization, i.e. by classifying the participants into one of three groups: positive 
bias, negative bias, inconsistent.   
• The model took into account the intensity of the individual bias (through the 
model’s parameters). 
• The model allowed for fairly precise forecasts of the individual patterns of 
responses. 
 
Budescu suggested that future research should consider evaluating the processes that 
humans use in randomization, rather than the outcomes that result [4, pg. 38]. 
4.2 Neuringer  
Neuringer introduced the idea that by providing feedback and statistical descriptors 
to subjects, random-like behavior can be learned.  Two experiments having similar 
procedures supported this notion.   
In Experiment 1, seven participants were told to press the “1” and “2” keys on the 
alpha numeric keypad of a computer as randomly as possible, with no feedback.  No time 
limit existed, and the subjects completed sixty trials of 100 responses each (6000 
responses).  The subjects were also paid for participating.  Next, the subjects repeated the 
above process, except after each trial, they were given the values of five statistical 
descriptors evaluated at the just-completed response. The subjects were asked to vary their 
responses to bring these five statistics as close as possible to values arising by applying the 
descriptors to output from a random number generator.  As one would expect, all subjects 
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differed considerably from the random generator during the no feedback condition.  
However, during the sixty trials of the feedback condition, all subjects were eventually 
indistinguishable from the random generator on all five tests.  Ultimately, it was 
determined that after less than an average of six hours of feedback training, the seven 
subjects behaved randomly according to the five statistical tests employed. 
 
Experiment 2 duplicated the former, except ten statistical descriptors were used as 
opposed to five.  Also, less advice and guidance were given to the four participants.  The 
subjects were told to try to imitate the toss of a coin and enter the digits “1” or “0” as 
randomly as possible, with no feedback.  Then, during the feedback condition, a table of 
numbers representing a different descriptive statistic appeared on the screen after each trial. 
Furthermore, toward the end of the session the subjects were told that they would receive 
two days off with pay if they attained a level of performance on all ten descriptors that 
showed them to be “random” over two successive sets of sixty trials each.  The subjects 
again differed significantly from the random generator when denied feedback, but then 
learned to behave randomly as assessed by the tests.   
 
 Neuringer’s experiment shed new light on randomness studies. It was the first study 
to teach random behavior through feedback.  Also, the success of his feedback condition 
argued against the theory that people are unable to behave randomly, suggesting  that 
people can learn random-like behavior through a controlled feedback environment. 
Neuringer had previously done experiments with pigeons, where the animals learned to 
generate highly variable sequences when rewarded for doing so [13, pg, 72]. 
 
 One might ask, did Neuringer’s study show human subjects could attain “true” 
randomness?  Did subjects learn to satisfy requirements of his feedback condition or did 
they acquire a general ability?  Neuringer took data from the last 60 trials in his second 
experiment and evaluated them using eight new statistics on which participants had never 
received any feedback.  Using a 5% level of significance, half of the subjects were 
indistinguishable from the random generator on all eight tests and the other two were 
indistinguishable on six of the eight tests.  These findings add further support to the 
effectiveness of the feedback procedure. 
 
For the skeptics of Neuringer’s work, one cannot assert that Neuringer’s subjects 
behaved “truly randomly.”  No individual set of statistics will prove randomness since it is 
possible for another statistic to show deviation from randomness.  Furthermore, his study 
relied on a computer-based random number generator as the comparison norm, which in 
itself is not “truly random,” since this generator utilized an equation that passes most 
criteria for analyzing finite random sequences [13, pg. 73]. 
 
Combined data from the subjects failed some tests for randomness.  The final 60 
trials were put together to make a single sequence of 6,000 numbers. The concatenated 
6,000 responses were examined using twelve tests including the previous eight statistics 
along with two chi-square tests and two additional autocorrelations.  The data failed the 
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four additional tests. Of course, the subjects were not provided with any feedback from any 
of the twelve new tests nor from any test focused on a single set of 6,000 responses. Future 
research might demand more stringent requirements in order to determine whether or not 
human subjects can learn to be indistinguishable from random generators. 
 
It is within the realm of possibility that subjects memorized long sequences of 
numbers that passed the tests.  It is not clear if this could account for the results.  Another 
possibility is that the subjects tuned into some random noise in the environment.  Thus, the 
responses would pass tests for randomness, but the subject would not have been producing 
them.   
 
4.3 Falk and Konold 
 
Unlike the other authors, Falk and Konold feel that judging a sequence’s 
randomness is more indicative of the subjective concept of randomness than is producing a 
random sequence. They use the analogy that a person may not be able to draw a scene, but 
may still be able to recognize the scene as one that he/she had observed. Thus, a person 
might be able to perceive randomness accurately, yet be unable to produce it.  They used 
the algorithmic definition of randomness as the basis for their study.  This approach relates 
to the 2nd mathematical proposal discussed earlier, which defines randomness in infinite 
sequences in terms of incompressibility.  The following explains why.  The algorithmic 
randomness of a binary sequence is the bit length of the shortest computer program that 
can reproduce the sequence.  Falk and Konold suggest that a finite random sequence is 
“psychologically” random when it has maximum complexity in that it cannot be easily 
reproduced.  They propose that their subjects attempt to make sense of a sequence in some 
way when asked to judge its randomness.  For instance, they might try to encode the 
sequence before making a judgment on its randomness.  They formed the hypothesis that 
human subjects will base their decision on the randomness in terms of how difficult it is to 
mentally encode the sequence.  They conducted three experiments to test their claim.   
 
In the first experiment, the participants were divided into three groups: the 
Judgment of Randomness group, the Memorization group, and the Assessed Difficulty of 
Memorization group.  Each group worked with 10 sequences, each 21 bits in length.  The 
probability of an alternation for the 10 sequences varied from 0.1 to 1.0 in steps of 0.1.   
 
Note that a sequence would be “ideally random” when the probability of an 
alternation is 0.5.  Proportions below this percentage indicate negative recency in a 
sequence, and those above indicate positive recency.  The first group (Judgment of 
Randomness) consisted of 97 subjects.  Each member of this group was instructed to rate 
each sequence on a scale of 0 to 10 according to his/her intuition of how likely it was that 
such a sequence was obtained by flipping a fair coin.  These participants were advised to 
inspect all of the 10 sequences first before assigning any ratings.  After examining all 10 
sequences, they could then begin rating the sequences according to the scale above (where 
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a score of 10 represents a sequence most likely to have been obtained by flipping a coin, 
and a score of 0 represents a sequence least likely). 
 
The second group (Memorization group) consisted of 80 participants.  Their task 
was to study each sequence until they could reproduce it. An individual sequence was 
presented on a computer screen.  Once the subject felt he/she could reproduce the given 
sequence, he/she pressed a key and the given sequence was masked.  The subject then 
typed that sequence from memory on another line.  If the subject reproduced the sequence 
correctly, then he/she proceeded to the next one.  However, if the sequence were incorrect, 
then the computer displayed the sequence once again, and informed the participant of two 
things, where the first error had occurred and how many errors were made.  The subject 
was then provided with another chance to view and to then type the sequence.  This 
process was repeated until the sequence was reproduced accurately, although the subjects 
did have an option to skip to the following sequence if he/she had failed after 5 attempts.  
During this activity, the computer recorded the total time the given sequence was displayed.   
 
The third group (Assessed Difficulty of Memorization group) consisted of 136 
participants.  They were presented with a given sequence and were required to assess its 
difficulty of memorization by rating the sequence with a 1, 2, or 3 – where 1 = easy, 2 = 
medium, and 3 = difficult.   
 
Results from this experiment indicate that the difficulty of encoding predicts 
perceived randomness better than the sequence’s degree of randomness does.  This 
supports Falk and Konold’s hypothesis that an assessment of the difficulty mediates the 
judgment of a sequence’s randomness.   
 
Falk and Konold speculated that their subjects would take advantage of any kind of 
a pattern in the stimuli in order to succeed at their individual tasks.  In other words, they 
thought their subjects would be fairly capable of detecting patterns in the sequences that 
contained too many alternations relative to chance.  Recall that a finite binary sequence 
would be “ideally random” if the probability of an alternation is 0.5.  However, Falk and 
Konold reported that their subjects were oblivious to patterns with probabilities of 
alternations ranging from 0.1 to 0.4, leading them to conclude that the subjects were 
clueless to slight-to-moderate degrees of deviations from randomness in the negatively 
biased sequences.  In fact, Falk and Konold claimed that these over-alternating sequences 
were even more difficult for the subjects to memorize than were the most random 
sequences.   
 
In the second experiment, Falk and Konold compared the randomness ratings from 
97 subjects in the first experiment to the difficulty other participants had in reproducing 
those sequences.  The subjects in this second experiment were advised that copying a 
sequence efficiently can be accomplished in stages by breaking the sequences into chunks 
to simplify the encoding task.  Twenty participants were instructed to look carefully at 
each sequence presented by a computer.  Once subjects felt able to reproduce the sequence, 
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they pressed the return key to mask sequence.  Subjects would then begin typing as much 
as remembered.  If the subject reproduced the segment correctly, then another chunk would 
appear and the subject would proceed to learn and copy it.  This process continued until the 
entire sequence was copied correctly.  If a mistake were made, then a note appeared and 
the segment would reappear for additional viewing and retyping until copied correctly.  
The subjects were advised that the computer recorded the time spent in viewing the target 
sequence.   
 
 Experiment 2 showed high correlations between the difficulty of reproducing 
sequences and the perceived randomness of sequences.  Thus, the findings in the second 
experiment corroborate those found in Experiment 1.  These results provide evidence 
against the hypothesis that copying a given sequence in parts may help the subjects to 
decrease bias. 
 
In Experiment 3, subjects assessed the difficulty of copying a sequence by breaking 
their assessments into stages.  Falk and Konold used longer sequences (of length 41) and 
obtained randomness ratings for them also.  Increasing the length of the sequences was 
done to extend the generality of their findings.  The instructions for this experiment were 
identical to those in the first, except the scale ranged from 1 to 10 instead of 0 to 10.  
Specifically, subjects were presented with 5 sequences and were told to pretend that they 
had to copy the sequences on the back of the page.  Since such sequences are usually 
copied in chunks, they were advised to try to divide each sequence as they would in order 
to reproduce in the fastest and most efficient way.  They were also instructed to mark their 
divisions with lines to show how the sequence was partitioned.  Once the subjects 
completed this task, they were instructed to return to their divided sequences and rate each 
segment from 1 to 3 representing how difficult it would be to copy (1=easy, 2=medium, 
and 3=difficult).   
 
Data in this last experiment corroborated those results found in the previous 
experiments.  The segments that the subjects rated as more difficult to reproduce were 
judged as most random.  The results indicated that these segments, judged as most random 
by the subjects, were negatively biased. 
 
Although the experiments varied in several ways such as the sequence length, 
rating scale, and format of sequence presentation, the results were uniform. Data from all 
three consistently attest to the intensity and prevalence of the bias towards alternations in 
the perception of randomness.  Thus, the subjects in Falk and Konold’s study seemed to 
have a more difficult time mentally encoding sequences with more alternations than would 
arise due to chance.  They associated the degree of difficulty to encode a sequence with its 
degree of randomness.  Thus, they judged these negatively biased sequences as “random.”   
 
From the results in Falk and Konold’s study, it appears that the idea of randomness 
as maximal complexity accurately represents the intuitive concept.  These results suggest 
that subjects equate randomness with the difficulty of encoding.  They appear to attempt 
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some kind of direct encoding and use the difficulty of that attempt to judge the randomness 
of a sequence. 
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Chapter 5. Statistical Tests for Randomness 
 
 All of the tests in the present chapter are variants of statistical hypothesis testing.  
Therefore, we begin with an exposition of inferential statistics, which is a way to draw 
inferences about a population from a sample.  Following the discussion of hypothesis 
testing, we will report on some of the statistical tests used in the randomness studies 
involving human subjects.  Specifically, we look at the Frequency Test, the Runs Test, and 
tests involving the chi-squared statistic or variants of it.   
  
In this chapter, we will explain how the information we need about probability 
distributions for testing the success of human “random number generators” can be 
estimated by computer simulations.  Simulations may not be acceptable in sensitive tests of 
high-quality random number generators, but they are entirely adequate for testing the 
rather modest abilities of human randomizers.  Basing our investigations on simulation 
permits great conceptual simplification. 
 
5.1 Parameters and Statistics 
 
A parameter is a numerical characteristic of a population.  Examples include: 
• the average (or mean) value of a numerical variable, e.g., average height of a 
New Yorker,  
• the largest (or smallest) value of a numerical variable. 
• the standard deviation of a numerical variable, the root of the mean squared 
error in a “population” of observations,  
Typically, a parameter is obtained from the distribution of some variable X (on a 
population).  For any population for which X makes sense, the distribution of X and the 
value of an associated parameter can be determined. 
 
A sample is a subset of a given population, i.e, a subpopulation.  If X is a variable 
on the population, then it is applicable to the subpopulation.  We define a statistic as a 
numerical characteristic of a sample.  The mean value of a numerical variable on a given 
sample would be a statistic, as would the sample maximum (or minimum).  The standard 
deviation of the set of values the variable takes on a sample would also be a statistic. 
 
5.2 An Example Relating to Hypothesis Testing 
 
One very common form of hypothesis testing concerns the process whereby we 
obtain information about a population parameter from statistics on samples taken from that 
population.  Often we are interested in determining how much confidence we can place in 
a claim that a population parameter lies in a particular range, when the only evidence 
available is the value of a related statistic. 
 
 27
Example 5.2.1.  Suppose that an exit poll of 400 randomly selected voters shows that 220 
people favor a certain candidate, say Judge Well.  Should we accept with certainty that 
Judge Well has won the election?  The answer is clearly “no” because the excess of 
favorable voters in the sample could have been due to pure chance.  
Suppose that in actual fact fewer than 50% of all votes went for Judge Well. Then, 
obtaining a 400-voter sample with an excess of votes in favor of the above candidate 
becomes increasingly unlikely as the excess increases.  Certainly, if a truly random sample 
of 400 voters included 300 who voted for Judge Well, then you would feel safe in acting 
on the assumption that Judge Well has won, even if actions based on error could be very 
damaging.   
When we come to evaluate the evidence that Judge Well has lost his campaign, we 
recognize that certain exit poll statistics would support this notion unequivocally, e.g., a 
huge preponderance of votes for Well.  Other statistics from the exit poll would support the 
opposite conclusion, e.g., only a few dozen votes for Well in a sample of hundreds.  
Finally, some kinds of polling results would support neither conclusion, e.g., a near split.  
Can we be more precise and quantitative? 
Suppose, as above, that 220 voters of the 400 in the exit poll vote for Judge Well.  
While this possibility exists even if the Judge has lost, it is not likely.  We can compute the 
exact probability that there are at least 220 voters favoring the Judge in the sample despite 
the Judge losing.  If Judge Well gets exactly half of the votes then by the binomial theorem, 
the probability that in a sample of 400 votes there are least 220 votes for the Judge is given 






















This probability is even smaller if the Judge gets less than half of the votes.  This 
shows that if we bet that a candidate has won every time we see an excess of at least 20 
more votes in an exit poll of 400 voters, then we can expect to win our bet at least 97% of 
the time.   
On the other hand, it would be dangerous to assume either a win or a loss if the 
overage were only 2 or 3, since a bet on either a win or a loss would be wrong a substantial 
amount of the time. For example, suppose there is a near exact split in the actual voting.  In 
roughly 40% of all samples of size 400 there will be 203 or more votes for Well and in 
another 40% there will be 203 votes against.  
This example has illustrated the basic intuitions behind Hypothesis Testing. 
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5.3 Hypothesis Testing 
Definition 5.3.1.  A null hypothesis (usually denoted by H0) is a hypothesis about a 
population parameter.   
From collected data (representative of a sample) in an experiment, a test statistic 
can be determined, which helps to evaluate the competing hypotheses.  If the statistic is 
very different from what would be expected if the null hypothesis were true, then the null 
hypothesis is rejected.  However, if the data do not vary significantly from what would be 
expected under the assumption that the null hypothesis is true, then the null hypothesis is 
not rejected.   
Definition 5.3.2.  The criterion for rejecting the null hypothesis is known as the 
significance level.  
A significance level is generally chosen by the user of the test, who, if rational, will 
select a level that is compatible with the risks involved in rejecting or not rejecting the null 
hypothesis.  The use of significance levels in hypothesis testing occurs as a process of 
ordered steps.  First, the distinction between the results of the experiment and the null 
hypothesis is made.  Next, the probability of a obtaining a statistic as different or more 
different from the null hypothesis (again, assuming the null hypothesis is true) than the 
statistic obtained in the sample is calculated.   
Definition 5.3.3.  The probability value (denoted p-value) calculated in a hypothesis test 
represents the probability of obtaining data as extreme or more extreme than the current 
data (assuming is true).   
Example 5.3.1.  Suppose data from an experiment yielded a p-value of 0.005.  This means 
that the probability of obtaining data as extreme or more extreme from the null hypothesis 
as those obtained in that experiment is 0.005.  It is not the probability of the null 
hypothesis itself.   
Last, this probability value is compared to the given significance level.  In the event 
that the probability is less than or equal to the significance level, then the null hypothesis is 
rejected and the result is said to be statistically significant.  Although subjective, 0.01 and 
0.05 levels of significance are commonly used. As the significance levels decrease, data 
must diverge more from the null hypothesis in order to be significant.  Thus, the 0.01 level 
is more conservative than the 0.05 significance level.  In many instances, researchers 
designate the null hypothesis as the opposite of what the experimenter actually believes.  
They put forth a null hypothesis hoping that the data can discredit it.  Also in hypothesis 
testing, an alternative hypothesis (usually denoted by H1  or HA) exists.  In the case where 
data are sufficiently strong to reject the null hypothesis, then the null hypothesis is rejected 
in favor of an alternative hypothesis.   
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Another aspect of hypothesis testing concerns not accepting the null hypothesis.  
When results from data do not call for the rejection of the null hypothesis, this does not 
mean that the null hypothesis is accepted in the voting example.  Some results may even 
indicate that the null hypothesis is false.  However, evidence may lack the strength for a 
case convincing enough to say the null hypothesis is false.   
We can, if we desire, to formulate randomness tests with hypotheses such as 
H0: Generated Data are representative of a random process 
H1: Generated Data are not representative of a random process 
Data will be presented for each test, and the p-value will be calculated in each case.  In 
contrast to practical uses of hypothesis testing, we do not need to act based on the truth or 
falsity of the null hypothesis.  We simply use the p-value as a measure of “how random” a 
performance is.   
5.4 Frequency Test For Randomness  
 
The Frequency Test focuses on the proportion of zeros and ones for the entire given 
sequence.  This test determines whether the number of zeros and the number of ones in a 
sequence are approximately the same.  This is what would be expected in a truly random 
sequence.  This test assesses the proximity of the fraction of ones to one-half, and shows 
how large an excess is required in order to reject the hypothesis of randomness at a given 
confidence level. 
 
Example 5.4.1.  Suppose s is a sequence of 0s and 1s with length n, and suppose that the 
number of ones is w.  (The quantity w is a fixed piece of data that we have concerning s, 
not to be confused with the random variable W, which will be used below.)  Now if  
n
w  is 
close to 
2
1  then we have no reason to reject the hypothesis that s was generated by a 
process similar to the coin-flip experiment—or as we say for brevity, s is “random.”  
(When we use “random” in this sense, we are referring to the third chapter.  Recall, that 
since s is finite, there is no absolute property of randomness in finite strings.)  On the 
other hand, if wnk −=
2
:  is sufficiently large, then this provides evidence against the 
hypothesis of “randomness.” 
 









, where W is a random variable representing the number of 1s that 
result from flipping a fair coin n times.  If this p-value is very small, then we view it as 
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evidence against the hypothesis that s is “random.”  Why is this reasonable?  Suppose p = 
0.01.  This value means that a sequence as deviant as s occurs only 1% of the time, when a 
truly random process is the source.  So, if our policy is to reject s as random when p 
=0 .01, we will eliminate a sequence from a truly random source only once in 100 tests in 
the long run. 
 The p-value above can be computer from the binomial theorem.  Let E be the set of 
all integers },...,4 ,3 ,2, 1{ ni∈  such that kin ≥−
2
  Then, the probability that we have 
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5.5 Runs Test For Randomness 
 
This final section begins by discussing the concepts of runs and lengths of runs in a 
binary sequence.  It describes the Runs Test, a basic statistical test that can be used to 
evaluate randomness in a given sequence.  Although the Runs Test has variations, we 
focused on three simple versions. One version examines the number of runs of some 
selected length in a given sequence.  The second examines the total number of runs in a 
given sequence.  The third examines the run-count vector, and examines the distance from 
this to the vector of expected run counts.  
 
Definition 5.5.1.  A run in a symbol sequence is a series of identical consecutive symbols 
bounded before and after by different symbols.  The length of a run is simply the number 
of times the repeated symbol occurs. 
 




We mark the sequence in order to display the runs: 
 
| T | HH | TT | HHHHHH | T | HH | TT | HH | TT | 
 
Thus, this sequence has a total of nine runs. The run lengths are as follows: 
 
1, 2, 2, 6, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2 
 
The results indicate 2 runs of length one, 6 runs of length two, 0 runs of lengths three, four 




Proposition 5.5.1.  In a truly random binary sequence of length n  (where  n  is very large), 
you would expect very nearly  
4
n  runs of length 1,  
8
n  runs of length 2,  
16
n  runs of length 
3,  
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n  runs of length 4, and so forth. 
 
Proof.  In order for a symbol to occupy a run of length 1, two conditions must be met.  
They are the following: 1) the symbol preceding the symbol in question must differ from it, 
and 2) the same holds for the symbol following the symbol in question.  Both of these 
conditions have probability ½.  They are independent (since we are assuming that the 
sequence is random), so the probability of them occurring together is ¼.  Similarly, for a 
symbol to be the first in a run of length 2, three independent conditions must be met, each 
having probability ½.  In general, for a symbol to be first in a run of length k, k+1 
conditions must be met. Note that the first and last symbols in the sequence are exceptions 
to this argument.  However, if n is large, the effect is small.  Now, the number of runs of 
length k  in a sequence of length  n  is exactly the same as the number of symbols that 
occur first in a run of length  k.  As we have seen that number is very nearly  n/2k+1.  Ñ 
 
The simplest version of the runs test for randomness examines whether the total 
number of runs of some selected length in the sequence to be tested is within the range that 
would be expected if the sequence had been generated by a truly random process.  There 
are several variants that build on this essential theme.  For example, the investigator might 
ask whether the total number of runs is within the expected range.  Other variants might 
test whether the total number of runs of several different lengths is reasonable, or whether 
some function of several run counts is in an expected range. 
 
Example 5.5.2.  In this example, we apply the variant of runs test in which we examine the 
runs of only certain lengths.  We ask whether or not the sequence to be tested has the 
appropriate number of runs of one particular length.  
 
To create an example, the author of this paper manually generated a sequence of 
1024 0s and 1s, attempting to act as randomly as possible. This sequence was translated 
into a list of 0s and 1s and entered into Mathematica for analysis.  The run count vector 
was {535, 38, 71, 26, 11, 4, 0, 1, 1}.  The test sequence immediately appears to have 
inappropriate run counts for a truly random sequence, especially for runs of length 1 and 
runs of length 2.  According to Proposition 5.5.1, in a truly random sequence of length 
1024, we would expect to have about 256 runs of length 1, 128 runs of length 2, 64 runs of 
length 3, 32 runs of length 4, 16 runs of length 5, 8 runs of length 6, 4 runs of length 7, 2 
runs of length 8, and 1 run of length 9.   
 
One simulation of a sequence of 1024 0s and 1s in Mathematica produced a run 
count vector of {249,122,64,32,15,12,3,2,3}.  This single simulation lies reasonably close 
to the expected run count vector, which tends to confirm our suspicion that the manually 
produced sequence is non-random.  To obtain more detailed information, we programmed 
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Mathematica to generate 100,000 trial sequences, each consisting of 1024 pseudo-random 
“coin flips”.  We then computed and examined the run count vectors of the 100,000 trials 
for 1024 “coin tosses.”  Table 5.5.1 shows the range of the run counts that occurred in our 
data. 
Table 5.5.1  
Number of Runs (Range) Length of Run 
[178, 330] 1 
[79, 180] 2 
[34, 97] 3 
[11, 57] 4 
[2, 33] 5 
[0, 22] 6 
[0, 15] 7 
[0, 11] 8 
[0, 7] 9 
[0, 6] 10 
[0, 5] 11 
[0, 3] 12, 13 
[0, 2] 14, 15 
[0, 1] 16—25, 27 
 
 From the table, we see that among the 100,000 simulations, there were some with 
as few as 178 runs of length 1 and some with as many as 330 runs of length 1, some with 
as few as 79 runs of length 2 and some with as many as 180 runs of length 2, and so forth.  
There were sequences with as many as 3 different runs of length 12, and there were 
sequences with as many as 3 different runs of length 13.  Runs of length 16 through 25 
were observed.  (The table does not tell us whether there were any trials that contained 
more than one run longer than 16.)   
  
Reconsidering the run count vector {535,38,71,26,11,4,0,1,1} from our manually 
generated sequence, it is clear that the number of runs of length 1 far exceed the expected 
number, and the number of runs of length 2 is way too small.  So, we certainly would not 
declare that this sequence passes the Runs Test for randomness.   
 
Example 5.5.3.  In this case, we study the total number of runs.  We determine whether or 
not the sequence to be tested has the appropriate run total.   
 
The author of this paper manually generated a sequence of one thousand 0s and 1s, 
attempting to be as random as possible. After generating the sequence, we translated it into 
a list of 0s and 1s and entered it into Mathematica in order to analyze it.  The run count 
vector for the data was found to be {407,47,59,30,14,6,6,3,1,1,1}.  In other words, in our 
sequence of length 1000, there were 407 runs of length 1, 47 runs of length 2, 59 runs of 
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length 3, etc. All together, there were 575 runs of lengths one through 11, these accounting 
for all 1000 entries.  
 
The pseudo-random number generator in Mathematica was used to simulate a 
sequence of 1000 “coin flips.” This generator performed 10,000 complete simulations, 
where each output consisted of a list of 1000 0s and 1s.  In these 10,000 trials, the smallest 
total run count was 446 and the largest was 561.  The table below gives the distribution of 
the variable “total number of runs” in the population of 10,000 simulations. 
Table 5.5.2 















The mean run count was 501 and the median was approximately the same.  Run 
counts, between 461 and 540, accounted for more than 98% of all the data.  We concluded 
that run counts outside this range have a p-value of roughly 2%.  The total run count of 575 
in the string that we produced manually was inconsistent with what would be expected in a 
random sequence, as the data from the simulation shows.  In fact, in a second simulation 
we generated roughly 500,000 trials, in each of which a random string of 1000 0s and 1s 
was produced.  There was only 1 case of a run count higher than 575.  If the sequence that 
we generated were part of an experiment (where we were testing its randomness), we 
would conclude that it fails the runs test.   
 
We extended our investigation with regard to the run count vector (from Example 
5.5.2) even further by defining a function that takes into account the run counts of all 
lengths up to 10. This function is an approximate chi-square test statistic.  We say 
approximate because the statistic that we compute does not have an exact chi-square 
distribution, since the distributions it comes from are neither normal nor independent. The 
chi-squared test statistic is calculated by comparing expected outcomes to observed 




Definition 5.5.2.  Let  C1, C2, ..., Cn  be the observed counts of runs of each length up to n,  
i.e., C1 = observed number of runs of length 1, C2 = observed number of runs of length 2, 
etc.  The C1, C2, ..., Cn  are not independent since  C1 + 2 C2  + 3 C3 + ... + n Cn = n.  Let  
E1, E2, ..., En  be the expected count of runs of length j , i.e., E1= expected count of runs of 
length 1, E2 = expected count of runs of length 2).  Then, we defined the chi-squared test 














We can create a modified statistic by restricting to run lengths of only certain sizes, 
e.g., from 1 to 10.  We entered this restricted statistic into Mathematica and evaluated it at 
each of 100,000 simulations of 1024 “coin flips.”  The following example describes the 
results of that simulation. 
 
Example 5.5.4.  Recall that the run count vector for our generated sequence of 1024 “coin 
flips” was {535,38,71,26,11,4,0,1,1,0}.  The chi-squared test statistic (restricted to runs of 
length 1 through 10) for this run count vector was 337.8.  An initial sequence of 1024 
“coin flips” was simulated for comparison producing a run count vector of 
{257,109,73,37,12,12,2,2,1,0} and a test statistic value of 15.9.  After this initial 
simulation, we simulated 100,000 trials of 1024 “coin flips.”  In these 100,000 trials, the 
smallest observed value of the statistic was 0.719, and the largest observed value of the 
statistic was 61.2.  Our statistical value of 377.8 is extremely far from the range of 
simulated chi-square test statistic values.  This unreasonably large value indicates a major 






[1] Baddeley, A.D. 1966.  The Capacity for Generating Information by Randomization.  
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology.  18:119-129. 
 
[2] Bakan, Paul. 1960.  Response-Tendencies in Attempts to Generate Random Binary 
Series.  American Journal of Psychology,  73: 127-131. 
 
[3] Bar-Hillel, Maya and Wagenaar, W.A. 1991. The Perception of Randomness.   
Advances in Applied Mathematics. 12: 428-454. 
 
[4] Budescu, David V. 1987.  A Markov Model for Generation of Random Binary 
Sequences.  Journal of Experimental Psychology.  13: 25-39. 
 
[5] Chaitin, G. J.  1975.  Randomness and Mathematical Proof.  Scientific American.   
232(5):  47-52.   
 
[6] Cook, Alex.  1967.  Recognition of Bias in Strings of Binary Digits.  Perceptual 
and Motor Skills.  24: 1003-1006. 
 
[7] Diener, Don and W. Burt Thompson.  1985.  Recognizing Randomness.  American 
Journal of Psychology.  98: 433-447. 
 
[8] Falk, R and Konold, C.  1997.  Making Sense of Randomness: Implicit Encoding as 
a Bias for Judgment.  Psycological Review.  104: 301-318. 
 
[9] Feller, William.  1950.  An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, 
Volume 1, Second Edition.  New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
 
[10] Goldberg, Samuel.  1960.  Probability: An Introduction.  New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc. 
 
[11] Knuth, Donald E.  1997.  The Art of Computer Programming: Semi-numerical 
Algorithms, Volume 2, Third Edition. California: Addison-Wesley. 
 
[12] Lopes, Lola L.  1982.  Doing the Impossible: A Note on Induction and the 
Experience of Randomness.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition.  8: 626-636. 
 
[13] Neuringer, Allen.  1986.  Can People Behave Randomly?: The Role of Feedback.  
Journal of Experimental Psychology:  General.  115:  62-75. 
 
 36
[14] Rath, Gustave.  1966.  Randomization by Humans.  American Journal of 
Psychology.  79: 97-103. 
 
[15] Ross, Bruce.  1955.  Randomization of a Binary Series.  American Journal of 
Psychology.  68: 136-138. 
 
[16] Volchan, Sergio B.  January 2002.  What is a Random Sequence?  American 
Mathematical Monthly.  46-63. 
 
[17] Wagenaar, W.A.  1970.  Appreciation of Conditional Probabilities in Binary 
Sequences.  Acta Psychologica.  34: 348-356. 
 
[18] Wagenaar, W.A.  1972.  Generation of Random Sequences by Human Subjects: A 
Critical Survey of Literature.  Psychological Bulletin.  77: 65-72. 
 
[19] Weiss, Robert.  1964.  On Producing Random Responses.  Psychological Reports. 
14: 931-941. 
 37
Appendix: Mathematica Commands 
 
This appendix provides the reader with some of the input commands used in 
Mathematica to obtain data in the Runs Test for Randomness simulations (Chapter 5, 
Section 5).  The steps below show how we obtained the results. 
 
Suppose  s  is a list of 0s and 1s  (e.g., let us input  s={0,1,0,0,1,1,1}).  The 
function  Split[]  takes the list of 0s and 1s (that we call s) and group the runs together. 
So applying this command to s, we have a run of length 1, followed by another run of 
length 1, a run of length 2, and a run of length 3.  Thus, if the input is  Split[s], then 
the output is  {{0},{1},{0,0},{1,1,1}}.   
 
 If the input is Length[Split[s]], then the output is 4. Since the Split[] 
command groups the runs together, Length[] counts the total number of runs for us. 
 
If the input is Random[Integer, {0,1}] then the output is either a 1 or 0.  
This command gives us a random integer in the range [0, 1] ;  it behaves like a coin toss. 
Table[Random[Integer, {0,1}], {1000}] returns a list giving the result of 
1000 “coin tosses”. 
 
If the input is  
 
Length[Split[Table[Random[Integer, {0,1}], {1000}]]], 
 
then Mathematica returns the total number of runs in a sequence of 1000 “coin flips” 
simulated by the computer.  
 
It requires more work to determine the run count vector for our simulations.  We 
are interested in the number (possibly 0) of runs of a given length.  Therefore, we define a 





  Map[Length, 
   Split[Sort[Join[ 
     Range[10],  
     Map[Length,Split[x]] 
   ]]] 
  ], 
  10]-Table[1, {10}] 
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This function returns a list with the first 10 entries of the run count vector for a 
given sequence.  It will the display the individual number of runs of each length from 1 to 
10 (will display 0, if for a certain length, there are no runs in that category).  In table 5.5.1, 
we altered this function by replacing the number 10 by the number 30. (By making this 
change, the function would be able to consider the possibility of having a run with a length 
as high as 30 during the simulations.).   
 
Example.  In our work, we created a sequence of 1024 0s and 1s by hand.  We 
entered it with the name stringrep .  When we input rcv[stringrep], the output 
was {535,38,71,26,11,4,0,1,1,0}, telling us that we have 535 runs of length 1, 
38 runs of length 2, 71 runs of length 3, etc. in our generated sequence.   
 
The simulations required obtaining the run count vectors of 1024 “coin tosses” 




With input rcv[t1024[]], Mathematica returns an individual run count vector 
for the simulated sequence of 1024 “coin flips”, e.g., 
{257,109,73,37,12,12,2,2,1,0}.  
 
To perform the 100,000 trials, which are described in the Table 5.5.1, the rcv[x_] 
function was adjusted to allow possible (although unlikely) runs of length 30.  The input 
Table[rcv[t1024[]],{100000}] lists the run-count vectors of 100,000 trials of 
1024 “coin tosses”.  
 






Example.  chistat[{a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j}] returns the following: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

































   
Here, {a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i,j} represents an observed run count vector.  
Recall that the run count vector for our generated sequence of 1024 “coin flips” was 
{535,38,71,26,11,4,0,1,1,0}.   
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We calculated the approximate chi-square statistic  using this data by the following: 
 
  chistat[{535,38,71,26,11,4,0,1,1,0}] 
 
This gives the test statistic value of 377.8.   
 




This calculates the approximate chi-square test statistic for 100,000 simulated toss-
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